
aass E 4-1 "? 
Book '5"^ 



.S54-4- 



THE BATTLE OF 
FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE 

November 30, 1864 

A statement of the erroneous claims made by 

General Schofield, and an exposition 

of the blunder which opened 

the battle 



Captain John K. Shellenberger 



One hundred, twenty-five 

copies privately printed for the author by 

THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY 

Cleveland: 1916 



/4^ 



THE BATTLE OF 
FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE 



THE BATTLE OF 
FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE 

November 30, 1864 

A statement of the erroneous claims made by 

General Schofield, and an exposition 

of the blunder which opened 

the battle 



Captain John K. Shellenberger 



One hundred, twenty-five 

copies privately printed for the author by 

THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY 

Cleveland: 1916 



m; 






# n/ («* 



b> 



PREFACE 

This monograph on the Battle of Franklin was 
read first at a meeting of the Minnesota Commandery 
of the Loyal Legion, December 9, 1902. Written 
after an exhaustive investigation begun many years 
before, the straightforward truth was told without 
fear or favor. The disgraceful and costly blunder 
with which the Battle of Franklin opened should 
have been investigated by a court of inquiry. The 
only action taken, however, was the deposing of Gen- 
eral Wagner, the junior in rank and the weakest in 
influence among the generals implicated, from the 
command of his division, with the statement that the 
blunder was due to his disobedience of orders. With 
this action the matter was hushed up. 

I have no personal grudge against General Scho- 
field, whose obstinate reliance on his ability to fore- 
see what General Hood would do, was the prime 
cause of the blunder. My feeling towards him is the 
same that any honest student will experience when 
he becomes convinced that an undeserved promotion 
was secured by dishonest methods. I began my in- 
vestigation with no thought of him but to secure 
evidence to disprove statements that I knew to be 
false, dishonoring the brigade to which I belonged. 
These had been made by General Cox in The March 
to the Sea-Franklin and Nashville^ and by Cap- 



John K. Shellenberger 



tain Scofield, a member of Cox's staff, in a paper 
entitled "The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville," 
published in the second volume of Sketches of War 
History^ issued by the Ohio Commandery of the 
Loyal Legion. 

"Misery loves company," and these two officers of 
the twenty-third corps, undoubtedly working in col- 
lusion, sought to mitigate their misery by putting 
two brigades of the fourth corps into the same class 
with their corps, whose battle line had proved un- 
equal to the strain of the two brigades passing over 
it when driven in from the front by the assaulting 
rebel army. That part of Cox's line broke in a panic 
at the sight of what was coming and abandoned a 
good line of breastworks before firing a single shot. 
Cox and Scofield wished to make it appear that the 
two brigades also became panic stricken and that 
they never stopped running until they were stopped 
by the river. That they were both capable of delib- 
erately bearing false witness needs no other proof 
than that furnished by themselves - by Cox in the 
contradictory statements made in his two official re- 
ports of the Battle of Franklin, and by Scofield in 
his false map of Spring Hill, which he claimed was 
drawn to scale, but which he had forged to uphold 
his claim for extraordinary services rendered by the 
regiment to which he belonged in the Battle of 
Spring Hill the day preceding the Battle of Franklin. 

The discovery of the discreditable part played by 
General Schofield in the Battle of Franklin was the 
greatest find of my investigation. There is not a bit 
of doubt that he remained heedless at his headquar- 



Preface j 

ters in Franklin while the enemy was engaged in 
preparations for assault in plain sight of our front. 
If he had given the proper attention to the important 
reports of General Cox, delivered in person, and of 
Colonel Lane, delivered by Captain Whitesides, he 
would have ridden to the front, which he could have 
done in less than ten minutes, to see for himself what 
was going on there. One look must have convinced 
him of the mistake he was making as to General 
Hood's intention. He then might have remedied 
the blunder he made, when he ordered Wagner's 
division into the position occupied by the brigades of 
Lane and Conrad. Yet his blunder went on to its 
logical finish and many hundreds of Union soldiers 
were needlessly killed, wounded, or captured; the 
army, on the crumbling brink of destruction, was 
saved by the independent action of Colonel Opdycke, 
one of the brigade commanders. 

In 1890 the National Tribune published my arti- 
cle on the Battle of Franklin, containing the same 
charges against Schofield that are made in this pam- 
phlet. Among many letters then received was one 
from General Stanley in which he wrote that he was 
surprised at the accuracy with which I had stated my 
points. One of the most important of those points 
was the statement of Doctor Clifife, which is con- 
firmed by General Stanley's ofiicial report: 

From one o'clock until four in the evening the enemy's 
entire force was in sight and forming for attack, yet in view 
of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former 
course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared 
so improbable as that they would assault. I was so confident 



8 John K. Shellenberger 

in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield's head- 
quarters until the firing commenced. 

The headquarters mentioned were at Doctor 
Clif]fe's house. In my personal interview with him, 
I found him a very reluctant witness. He was evi- 
dently proud of having entertained two major-gen- 
erals and showed no inclination to say anything 
against either of them. He had told his story to a 
few of his intimate friends and one of them had 
repeated it to me. It was not until I had told him 
what I had heard and who my informant was that I 
could get him to talk. He then confirmed what I 
had already heard and added a few additional par- 
ticulars, the most important one being his statement 
that Cox was at his house conferring with Schofield 
shortly before the battle began. 

A thousand copies of the Tribune article were ob- 
tained and a copy was mailed to every member of the 
Ohio Commandery and to many others, including 
General Schofield. Many members of the Ohio 
Commandery were residents of Cincinnati or Cleve- 
land. At that time Schofield was commanding the 
army and was a resident of Washington City. He 
took notice of this article by getting Washington cor- 
respondents of Cincinnati and Cleveland papers to 
write letters in his praise. Those letters contained 
nothing to refute the specific charges made in the 
Tribune^ but dealt in glittering generalities about 
the important services rendered by Schofield during 
the war. Moreover in his Forty-six Years in the 
Army, while devoting many pages to the Battle of 
Franklin, Schofield has nothing to say about his 



Preface 9 

failure to give some personal attention to the very 
extraordinary situation that developed right under 
his nose, so to speak. The audacity he displayed in 
claiming credit for the victory, while in Washington 
soon after the battle and finding that the administra- 
tion was ignorant of its details, was a brilliant stroke 
of genius of its kind- but not such genius as any lover 
of his country will wish to see encouraged among the 
ambitious officers in our army. 

Cox was with Schofield in Washington and must 
have rendered invaluable assistance. No doubt each 
certified to the meritorious services of the other and 
Cox got his share of the reward in his promotion to 
the command of the twenty-third corps. Is it any 
wonder that two such able but unscrupulous men, 
while working together, with no one present to ques- 
tion their claims, should score such a success in de- 
ceiving President Lincoln? Was it for the meritori- 
ous services Schofield rendered, while sitting idly in 
Doctor Clifife's house, utterly indifferent to the re- 
ports coming to him of the preparations of the enemy 
for assault; and was it for the gallantry he displayed 
when he skedaddled to the fort across the river as 
soon as the firing began, thereby abandoning the con- 
duct of the battle to his subordinates, that they 
claimed the promotion he was given? If he had 
received the award his conduct that day so justly 
merited, would it not have come in the verdict of a 
court-martial such as he declares in his book ought 
to have been given to Wagner, Lane, and Conrad? 
''According to the established rules of war these three 
commanders" and Schofield and Cox "ought to have 



lo John K. Shellenberger 

been tried by court-martial and, if found guilty, shot 
or cashiered for sacrificing their own men and en- 
dangering the army." 

If any of the blame attached to General Stanley, 
he washed it away gallantly with the blood of his 
wound. 

John K. Shellenberger. 
Hampton, Virginia, November 5, 1915. 



THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN 

Any facts or information concerning the Battle of 
Franklin coming my way has always been devoured 
with a greedy interest, and because of this interest, I 
have given far more research to this battle than to 
any other in which I was engaged. On account of 
the open character of the battle-field, the limited 
area, where the fighting raged, and my presence in 
the midst of that area, the leading features of the 
battle came under my personal observation, but wher- 
ever that observation was wanting for giving a clear 
account I have supplied the deficiency with informa- 
tion gathered from other reliable sources. 

I was commanding Company B, Sixty-fourth 
Ohio regiment, Conrad's brigade, Wagner's division. 
Fourth corps. Wagner's division was the rear guard 
on the retreat to Franklin, and about mid-forenoon 
of November 30, 1864, arrived on top of the Winsted 
Hills, two miles south of Franklin. Halting there 
long enough to snatch a hasty breakfast, the division 
then hurried into battle line to delay the columns of 
the enemy, in close pursuit, by compelling them to 
deploy. The position was held as long as possible 
without bringing on a battle and then Wagner began 
to retire slowly towards Franklin. The town lies 
nestled in a little valley in a bend of Harpeth River. 
A stand was made to get the artillery and the long 



12 John K. Shellenberger 

wagon train over the river and while our command- 
ing general, Schofield, was giving his personal at- 
tention to the facilities for crossing, the main body 
of the army, under the supervision of General Cox, 
was engaged in establishing our defensive line, which 
stretched across the river bend, in the arc of a circle, 
inclosing the town. As fast as the troops arrived and 
were placed in position they hurried to cover them- 
selves with breastworks, and by the time the enemy 
was ready to attack. Cox's line was well intrenched. 
The train got over the river in time for the troops 
to have crossed before the enemy appeared, but the 
opportunity thus offered for securing a much stronger 
defensive position, with the river in front instead of 
in rear, was not improved. 

By one o'clock Wagner had fallen back so close to 
Cox's line that he began a movement to withdraw his 
division behind that line. Conrad's brigade had been 
called in from the left flank and was marching in 
column of fours along the Columbia Pike, with the 
head of the column approaching the breastworks, 
when Wagner received an order from Schofield to 
take up a position in front of Cox's line. In obe- 
dience to this order Conrad counter-marched his bri- 
gade a short distance and then deployed it in a single 
line of battle, having a general direction nearly par- 
allel with Cox's line. Five of the six regiments com- 
posing the brigade were posted on the east side and 
one on the west side of the pike, four hundred and 
seventy yards in advance of Cox's line, as measured 
along the pike. Lane's brigade, following Conrad's, 
was posted on Conrad's right. Lane's line trending 



The Battle of Franklin 13 

backward on the right in general conformation with 
Cox's line. When General Hood assaulted, Con- 
rad's five regiments east of the pike proved to be in 
the direct pathway of his assault and they were over- 
whelmed before the line west of the pike, which was 
greatly refused as to that pathway, became fully en- 
gaged. 

When Opdycke's brigade, the last to withdraw, 
came up to the position occupied by Conrad and 
Lane, Wagner rode forward and ordered Opdycke 
into line with them. Colonel Opdycke strenuously 
objected to this order. He declared that troops out 
in front of the breastworks were in a good position 
to aid the enemy and nobody else. He also pleaded 
that his brigade was worn out, having been march- 
ing for several hours during the morning in line of 
battle in sight of the enemy, climbing over fences 
and passing through woods, thickets, and muddy corn- 
fields, while covering the rear of our retreating col- 
umn, and was entitled to a relief. While they were 
discussing the matter they rode along the pike to- 
gether, the brigade marching in column behind them, 
until they entered the gap in the breastworks left for 
the pike and finding the ground in that vicinity fully 
occupied by other troops, they kept along till they 
came to the first clear space which was about two 
hundred yards inside the breastworks. There Wag- 
ner turned away with the final remark, "Well, Op- 
dycke, fight when and where you damn please; we 
all know you'll fight." Colonel Opdycke then had 
his brigade stack arms on the clear space, and his 
persistence in thus marching his brigade inside the 



14 John K. Shellenberger 

breastworks proved about two hours later to be the 
salvation of our army. 

When Conrad's brigade took up its advanced posi- 
tion we all supposed it would be only temporary, but 
soon an orderly came along the line with instructions 
for the company commanders and he told me that the 
orders were to hold the position to the last man, and 
to have my sergeants fix bayonets and to instruct my 
company that any man, not wounded, who should 
attempt to leave the line without orders, would be 
shot or bayonetted by the sergeants. 

Four of Conrad's regiments, including the Sixty- 
fourth Ohio, had each received a large assignment of 
drafted men so recently that none of these men had 
been with their regiments more than a month and 
many had joined within a week. The old soldiers 
all believed that the harsh orders were given for 
effect upon these drafted men, as we never before 
had received any such orders on going into battle. 

We then began to fortify. On the retreat that 
morning we had passed an abandoned wagon loaded 
with intrenching tools, and by order each company 
had taken two spades from the wagon, the men reliev- 
ing each other in carrying them. These spades were 
the only tools we had to work with. The ground we 
occupied was a large old cottonfield not under culti- 
vation that year, and had been frequently camped on 
by other troops who had destroyed all the fences and 
other materials ordinarily found so handy in building 
hasty breastworks, so that on this occasion our only 
resource was the earth thrown with the few spades we 
had. 



The Battle of Franklin 15 



Under the stimulus afforded by the sight of the 
enemy in our front preparing for attack, the men 
eagerly relieved each other in handling the spades. 
As soon as a man working showed the least sign of 
fatigue, a comrade would snatch the spade out of his 
hands and ply it with desperate energy. Yet in spite 
of our utmost exertions when the attack came we had 
only succeeded in throwing up a slight embankment, 
which was high enough to give good protection 
against musket balls to the man squatting down in the 
ditch from which the earth had been thrown ; but on 
the outside, where there was no ditch, it was so low 
that a battle line could march over it without halting. 
The ground ascended with an easy grade from our 
position back to Cox's line, and all the intervening 
space, as well as a wide expanse to our left, was as 
bare as a floor of any obstruction. In our front was 
a wide valley extending to the Winsted Hills. This 
valley was dotted with a few farm-buildings, and 
there were also some small areas of woodland, but 
much the greater portion of it consisted of cleared 
fields. As our line was first established the Sixty- 
fifth Ohio was on the left of the brigade, but it was 
afterwards withdrawn, leaving the Sixty-fourth Ohio 
on the left and three companies, H, K, and B, were 
partially refused to cover the left flank. My position 
was at the refused angle. 

About the time that we began to fortify, my atten- 
tion was called to a group of mounted officers in a 
field on the side of the Winsted Hills, to the east of 
the Columbia Pike, and about a mile and a half in 
our front. This group undoubtedly consisted of 



i6 John K. Shellenberger 

General Hood and his staff. An officer who was 
present with Hood has stated that from their position 
they had a good view of Cox's line and that after 
giving this line a hasty survey through his field-glass, 
General Hood slapped the glass shut with an em- 
phatic gesture and decisively exclaimed, "We will 
attack!" Staff officers then began to gallop forth 
from the group with orders for the troops to form for 
assault. 

At the angle where I was, the view of the valley 
directly in our front and to our right was shut off 
by a piece of woodland a short distance in advance 
of our position, so that we did not see anything of the 
movements of Cheatham's corps, which formed 
astride the Columbia Pike. Looking up the valley 
to our left front was a wide expanse of cleared fields 
and in these fields we plainly saw the movements of 
a large part of Stewart's corps. They first came into 
view from behind a body of timber over towards the 
river, deploying from column on the right by file into 
line on double quick. As fast as the troops could 
be marched up from the rear Stewart extended his 
lines over towards the pike. We could see all their 
movements so plainly, while they were adjusting 
their lines, that there was not a particle of doubt in 
the mind of any man in my vicinity as to what was 
coming. Moreover the opinion was just as universal 
that a big blunder was being committed in compel- 
ling us to fight with our flank fully exposed in the 
midst of a wide field, while in plain sight in our rear 
was a good line of breastworks with its flank pro- 
tected by the river. The indignation of the men grew 



The Battle of Franklin 17 

almost into a mutiny and the swearing of those gifted 
in profanity exceeded all their previous efforts in that 
line. Even the green drafted men could see the folly 
of our position, for one of them said to me, "What 
can our generals be thinking about in keeping us out 
here! We can do no good here. We are only in the 
way. Why don't they take us back to the breast- 
works?" 

The regiment contained a number of men who 
had not reenlisted when the regiment had veteran- 
ized and whose time had already expired. They 
were to be mustered out as soon as we got back to 
Nashville and, with home so nearly in sight after 
more than three years of hard service, these men were 
especially rebellious. First Sergeant Libey of Com- 
pany H, was a non-veteran, and was also a fine speci- 
men, mentally and physically, of the best type of our 
volunteer soldiers. When the enemy was approach- 
ing he twice got up from the line and started for the 
breastworks, vehemently declaring that he would 
not submit to having his life thrown away, after his 
time was out, by such a stupid blunder. The little 
squad of non-veterans belonging to the company 
both times got up and started to go with him and both 
times they all returned to the line on the profane 
order of their captain, "God damn you, come back 
here." A few minutes later the sergeant was killed 
while we were retreating to the breastworks. 

It took two hours, from two till four o'clock, for 
the corps of Cheatham and Stewart to come up and 
get into position and then they advanced to the as- 
sault in heavy lines of battle. We kept the spades 



l8 John K. Shellenberger 

flying until they had approached within range of our 
skirmish line, which fired a few shots and then began 
to retreat rapidly. Then the spades were dropped 
and the men taking their muskets squatted down be- 
hind the low streak of earth they had thrown out to 
receive the coming onset. A little later Company 
E, from the skirmish line, came scurrying back, the 
men, with very serious looks on their faces, settling 
down with the line like a covey of flushed birds 
dropping into cover. 

All that has been related concerning Conrad's 
brigade took place in full view of that part of Cox's 
line extending from the river on our left to the Col- 
umbia Pike, and if there had been any previous doubt 
in the minds of any of these on-looking thousands as 
to Hood's intention, his determination to assault was 
as plainly advertised as it possibly could be during 
the intense minutes that it took his army to march 
in battle line from the place of its formation to our 
advanced position. General Cox has claimed that 
Wagner's division was ordered to report to him and 
that he was in immediate command of all the troops 
engaged in the battle. By his own statement he was 
on a knoll in the rear of Stiles' brigade, on the left 
of his line, where he had the best view of the whole 
field. From this knoll he had been watching the 
preparations for attack, and all the time directly un- 
der his eyes was Conrad's brigade busily engaged in 
fortifying to resist that attack. If Wagner was dis- 
obeying his orders by remaining in front too long, as 
was given out a few days later when he was made a 



The Battle of Franklin 19 

scapegoat for the blunder of his position, Cox was 
watching him do it and took no measures to prevent 
it. If it was Cox's expectation that Wagner would 
withdraw the two brigades at the last moment, he 
must have known better when he saw Conrad's bri- 
gade squat down behind their half-built breastwork 
preparatory to giving battle. There was even then 
time, if prompt action had been taken, for a staff 
officer to gallop to the front, before the firing began, 
with a peremptory order for Conrad and Lane to 
get out of the way; but Cox, fresh from a personal 
conference with Schofield, to whom he had reported 
the situation and whose orders he had received with 
reference to holding the position, looked quietly on 
and thereby approved of Wagner's action. 

It was a pleasant, hazy, Indian summer day, and 
so warm that I was carrying my overcoat on my arm. 
When the line squatted down I folded the coat into a 
compact bundle and placed it on the edge of the bank 
in rear of my company and sat on it, with my feet in 
the shallow ditch. By craning my neck, I could look 
over our low parapet. The battle was opened by a 
rebel cannon, which, unnoticed by us, had taken posi- 
tion on a wooded knoll off our left front over towards 
the river. The first shot from this cannon flew a 
little high, directly over the angle where I was sit- 
ting. The second shot dropped short, and I was 
thinking with a good deal of discomfort that the third 
shot would get the exact range and would probably 
lift some of us out of that angle; but before it came 
our line had opened fire on the approaching rebel 



20 John K. Shellenberger 

line and I became so much interested in that fire that 
I never knew whether there was a third shot from the 
cannon. 

Our fire checked them in front, for they halted 
and began to return it, but for a minute only, for, 
urged on by their officers they again came forward. 
Their advance was so rapid that my company had 
fired only five or six rounds to the man when the 
break came. The salient of our line was near the 
pike and there the opposing lines met in a hand-to- 
hand encounter in which clubbed muskets were used, 
but our line quickly gave way. I had been glancing 
uneasily along our line, watching for a break as a 
pretext for getting out of there, and was looking to- 
wards the pike when the break first started. It ran 
along the line so rapidly that it reminded me of a 
train of powder burning. I instantly sprang to my 
feet and looked to the front. They were coming on 
the run, emitting the shrill rebel charging yell, and 
so close that my first impulse was to throw myself 
flat on the ground and let them charge over us. But 
the rear was open and a sense of duty, as well as a 
thought of the horrors endured in rebel prisons, con- 
strained me to take what I believed to be the very 
dangerous risk of trying to escape. I shouted to my 
company, "Fall back! Fall back!" and gave an ex- 
ample of how to do it by turning and running for the 
breastworks. 

As the men were rising to go, the rebels fired, but 
so hastily and with such poor aim that their fire did 
not prove nearly so destructive as I had feared. 
Probably most of their guns were empty, although I 



The Battle of Franklin 21 

did not think so just then. The range was so close 
that it seemed bullets had never before hissed with 
such a diabolical venom, and every one that passed 
made a noise seemingly loud enough to tear one in 
two. I had forgotten my overcoat, but had run only 
a rod or two when I thought of it and stopped and 
looked back with the intention of returning to get it; 
but the rebels then appeared to be as close to the coat 
as I was and very reluctantly, for it was a new one, I 
let them have it. After running a few rods farther I 
again looked back. They were standing on the low 
embankment we had left, loading and firing at will, 
but just as I looked some of their officers waved their 
swords and sprang forward. The fire slackened as 
they started in hot pursuit to get to the breastworks 
with us. 

Our men were all running with their guns in their 
hands, which was good evidence that there was no 
panic among them. While knapsacks or blanket 
rolls were frequently thrown away, I did not see a 
single man drop his gun unless hit. The cry of some 
of our wounded who went down in that wild race, 
knowing they would have to lie there exposed to all 
the fire of our own line, had a pathetic note of despair 
in it, I had never heard before. A rebel account has 
stated that the next morning they found some of the 
dead with their thumbs chewed to a pulp. They had 
fallen with disabling wounds and the agony of their 
helpless exposure to the murderous fire from our 
breastworks, which swept the bare ground, where 
they were lying, had been so great that they had 
stuck their thumbs in their mouths and bit on them 



22 John K. Shellenberger 

to keep from bleating like calves. Many of the bod- 
ies thus exposed were hit so frequently that they were 
literally riddled with bullet holes. 

Our men were nearly all directed towards the pike 
as if with the intention of entering the breastworks 
through the gap there. I reasoned, however, that 
the hottest fire would be directed where the crowd 
was densest, and I veered off in an effort to get away 
from there. While running rapidly with body bent 
over and head down, after the involuntary manner 
of men retreating under fire, I came into collision 
with a man running in a similar attitude, but headed 
towards the gap. The shock was so great that it 
knocked him down and pretty well knocked the wind 
out of me. Just as we met, a rebel shell exploded 
close over our heads and as his body was rolling over 
on the ground, I caught a glimpse of his upturned 
face and, in its horrified look, read his belief that it 
was the shell that had hit him. The idea was so com- 
ical that I laughed, but my laugh was of very brief 
duration when I found myself so much disabled that 
I was rapidly falling behind. With panting lungs 
and trembling legs I toiled along, straining every 
nerve to reach the breastwork, but when it was yet 
only a few steps away, even with life itself at stake, 
I could go no farther, and thought my time had come. 
My brave mother, the daughter of a soldier of 1812 
and the granddaughter of a Revolutionary soldier 
had said, when I had appealed to the pride in her 
military ancestry so successfully that she had con- 
sented to my enlistment, ''Well, if you must go, don't 
get shot in the back." I thought of her and of that 



The Battle of Franklin 23 

saying and faced about to take it in front. While I 
was slowly turning, my eyes swept the plain in the 
direction of the pike. There were comparatively 
few of our men in my immediate vicinity, but over 
towards the pike the ground was thickly covered with 
them, extending from the breastworks nearly a hun- 
dred yards along the pike, and in some places so 
densely massed as to interfere with each other's move- 
ments. The fleetest footed had already crossed the 
breastwork and all those outside were so thoroughly 
winded that none of them could go any faster than a 
slow, labored trot. The rear was brought up by a 
ragged fringe of tired stragglers who were walking 
doggedly along, apparently with as much unconcern 
as if no rebels were in sight. The rebel ranks were 
almost as badly demoralized by pursuit as ours by 
retreat. Their foremost men had already overtaken 
our rearmost stragglers and were grabbing hold of 
them to detain them. 

Suddenly my attention was riveted so intently on 
the nearest rebel to myself that in watching him I 
became oblivious to all other surroundings, for I 
thought I was looking at the man who would shoot 
me. He was coming directly towards me, on a dog 
trot, less than fifty yards away, and was in the act of 
withdrawing the ramrod from the barrel of his gun. 
When this action was completed, while holding the 
gun and ramrod together in one hand, he stopped to 
prime and then, much to my relief, aimed and fired 
at a little squad of our men close on my right. I 
heard the bullet strike and an exclamation from the 
man who was hit. The rebel then started to trot 



24 John K. Shellenberger 

forward again, at the same time reaching back with 
one hand to draw a fresh cartridge. By this time 
having rested a little, I looked back over my shoulder 
towards the breastwork. I noticed that there was a 
ditch on the outside and the sight of this ditch 
brought renewed hope. With the fervent prayer, 
into which was poured all the intense longing for 
more life, natural to my vigorous young manhood, 
^'O, God, give me strength to reach that ditch," I 
turned and staggered forward. I fell headlong into 
the ditch just as our line there opened fire. The 
roar of their guns was sweeter than music and I 
chuckled with satisfaction as I thought, "Now, Rebs, 
your turn has come and you must take your medi- 
cine." I lay as I fell, panting for breath, until I 
had caught a little fresh wind and then began to 
crawl around to take a peep and see how the rebels 
were getting along. 

When my body was lengthwise of the ditch I hap- 
pened to raise my head and was astounded by the 
sight of the rebels coming into the ditch between me 
and the pike, the nearest of them only a few yards 
away. They were so tired that they seemed scarcely 
able to put one foot before the other and many of 
them stopped at the ditch utterly unable to go a 
step farther until they had rested. It was only the 
strongest among them who were still capable of the 
exertion of climbing over the breastwork. If the 
men behind that work had stood fast, not one of those 
tired rebels would ever have crossed that parapet 
alive. Transfixed with amazement, I watched them 
until the thought flashed into my mind that in an in- 



The Battle of Franklin 25 

stant some of their comrades would come in on top 
of me and I would be pinned down with a bayonet. 
The thought of a bayonet thrust was so terrifying, 
that it spurred me into a last effort, and with the 
mental ejaculation, "I never will die in that way," I 
sprang on top of the breastwork. Crouching there 
an instant with both hands resting on the headlog, I 
gave one startled look over my shoulder. The im- 
pression received was that if I fell backward they 
would catch me on their bayonets. Then followed a 
brief period of oblivion for which I can not account. 
With returning consciousness I found myself lying 
in the ditch on the inside of the breastwork, trampled 
under the feet of the men, and with no knowledge 
whatever of how I got there. It is possible that I 
was taken for a rebel when I sprang up so suddenly 
on top of the breastwork and that I was knocked 
there by a blow from one of our own men. I was 
lying across the body of a wounded man who had 
been hit by a bullet which, entering at his cheek, had 
passed out the back of his head. He was uncon- 
scious, but still breathing. The breast of my coat 
was smeared with the blood from his wound. The 
press was so great that I could not get on my feet, 
but in a desperate effort to avoid being trampled to 
death managed in some way to crawl out between the 
legs of the men to the bank of the ditch, where I 
lay utterly helpless with burning lungs still panting 
for breath. My first thought was of the rebels I had 
seen crossing the breastwork, and I looked toward the 
pike. I had crossed our line close to a cotton-gin 
that stood just inside our works and the building ob- 



26 John K. Shellenberger 

structed my view except directly along the ditch and 
for a short distance in rear of it. 

Our men were all gone from the ditch to within a 
few feet of where I was lying. A little beyond the 
other end of the building stood two cannon pointing 
towards me with a group of rebels at the breech of 
each one of them trying to discharge it. They were 
two of our own guns that had been captured before 
they had been fired by our gunners and were still 
loaded with the double charges of canister intended 
for the rebels. Fortunately the gunners had with- 
drawn the primers from the vents and had taken 
them along when they ran away and the rebels were 
having difficulty in firing the guns. As I looked they 
were priming them with powder from their musket 
cartridges, and no doubt intended to fire a musket 
into this priming. Just then I was too feeble to make 
any effort to roll my body over behind the cover of 
the building, but shut my eyes and set my jaws to 
await the outcome where I was lying. After waiting 
for some time and not hearing the cannon, I opened 
my eyes to see what was the matter. The rebels were 
all gone and the ditch was filled with our men as far 
as I could see. If the rebels had succeeded in firing 
those two cannon they would have widened the breach 
in our line so much farther to our left that it might 
have proved fatal, since the two brigades holding our 
line, from the vicinity of the cotton-gin to the river, 
had each but a single regiment of reserves. The men 
in the ditch at my side, when I first saw the cannon, 
were so busily engaged in keeping out the rebels who 
filled the ditch on the other side of the parapet, that I 



The Battle of Franklin 27 

do not believe they ever saw the two cannon posted to 
rake the ditch. Their conduct was most gallant. 

For a brief period the rebels held possession of the 
inside of our breastworks along the entire front of 
Strickland's brigade on the west side, and of Reilly's 
brigade down to the cotton-gin on the east side of the 
pike; and the ground in their possession was the key 
to Cox's entire position. This break in our line was 
identical in extent with the front covered by the great 
body of Wagner's men in falling back, and it was 
occasioned by the panic and confusion created by 
Wagner's men in crossing the breastworks. Cox's 
men, along this part of our line, seem to have lost 
their nerve at the sight of the rebel army coming and 
on account of their own helpless condition. They 
could not fire a single shot while Wagner's men were 
between themselves and the rebels. The first rebels 
crossed the breastworks side by side with the last of 
Wagner's men. 

At some point a break started and then it spread 
rapidly until it reached the men who were too busily 
occupied in firing on the rebels to become affected by 
the panic. Opdycke's brigade was directly in the rear 
of where this break occurred. At the sound of the 
firing in front, Opdycke had deployed his brigade 
astride the pike, ready for instant action, and as soon 
as he saw that a stampede was coming from the 
breastworks, without waiting for any order, he in- 
stantly led his brigade forward. His brigade re- 
stored the break in our line, charging straight 
through the rout, after a desperate hand-to-hand en- 
counter in which Opdycke himself, first firing all 



28 John K. Shellenberger 

the shots in his revolver and then breaking it over 
the head of a rebel, snatched up a musket and fought 
with that for a club. It is true that hundreds of 
brave men from the four broken brigades of Conrad, 
Lane, Reilly, and Strickland, who were falling back, 
when they met Opdycke's advancing line, saw that 
the position would not be given up without a des- 
perate struggle and faced about and fought as gal- 
lantly as any of Opdycke's men in recovering and 
afterwards in holding our line; but if Opdycke's 
brigade had not been where it was, the day undoubt- 
edly would have closed with the utter rout and ruin 
of our four divisions of infantry south of the river. 
When General Cox met Opdycke on the field imme- 
diately after the break was restored, he took him by 
the hand and fervently exclaimed, "Opdycke, that 
charge saved the day." 

The front line of Strickland's brigade extended 
along the foot of the garden of Mr. Carter, the owner 
of the plantation on which the battle was fought. 
The reserve line was posted behind the fence at the 
other end of the garden, close to the Carter residence, 
where the ground was a little higher, and sixty-five 
yards in rear of the main line. This reserve line, 
with the fence for a basis, had constructed a rude 
barricade as a protection against bullets which might 
come over the front line. When Opdycke's demi- 
brigade, charging on the west side of the pike, came 
to this barricade, it halted there, probably mistaking 
it for our main line. The rebels in the garden fell 
back behind the cover of Strickland's breastwork and 
during the remainder of the battle, on this part of the 



The Battle of Franklin 29 



field, the opposing lines maintained these relative 
positions. Every attempt, made by either side to 
cross the garden, met with a bloody repulse. The 
body of one dead rebel w^as lying between the barri- 
cade and the Carter house and this body no doubt 
indicated the high water mark reached by Hood's 
assault. It is only fair to the gallant rebels, who pen- 
etrated our line, to state that Opdycke's charge was 
made too promptly to give them any time to recover 
their wind, and that therefore in the hand-to-hand 
struggle, they were laboring under the great disad- 
vantage of the physical fatigue already described. 

Returning to my personal experiences : when I had 
rested enough to be able to sit up, I found at my feet 
a can of cofifee standing on the smouldering embers of 
a small camp fire, and beside it a tin plate filled with 
hard tack and fried bacon. Some soldier was evi- 
dently ready to eat his supper, when he was hastily 
called into line by the opening of the battle in front. 
I first took a delicious drink out of the coffee can and 
then helped myself to a liberal portion of the hard 
tack and bacon, and while sitting there eating and 
drinking, incidentally watched the progress of the 
fighting. By the time I had finished I was so fully 
rested and refreshed that thereafter I was able to 
shout encouragement to the men fighting in my vicin- 
ity as loud as any other company commander. 

Along that part of the line only the breastwork 
separated the combatants. On our side we had five 
or six ranks deep, composed of the original line, the 
reserves, and Conrad's men, all mixed up together 
without any regard to their separate organizations. 



30 John K. Shellenherger 

The front rank did nothing but fire. The empty 
guns were passed back to those in rear who reloaded 
them. The rear rank was kneeling with guns at a 
ready. If a rebel raised his head above the breast- 
work, down it would instantly go with one or more 
bullets through it, fired by these rear rank men. 

In this close fighting the advantage was all on our 
side, for our front rank men, standing up close 
against the perpendicular face of the breastwork on 
our side, could poke the muzzle of a gun over the 
headlog and by elevating the breech could send a 
plunging shot among the rebels who filled the outside 
ditch and expose for an instant only the hand and a 
part of the arm that discharged the gun. But on ac- 
count of the convex face of the work on their side the 
rebels could not reach us with their fire without ex- 
posing themselves above the breastwork. They kept 
up the vain struggle until long after dark, but finally 
elevated their hats on the ends of their muskets above 
the breastwork, as a signal to us, and called over that 
if we would stop shooting they would surrender. 
When our firing ceased, many of them came over and 
surrendered, but many more took advantage of the 
darkness and of the confusion created by their com- 
rades in getting over the breastwork to slip back to 
their own lines. Soon after the firing had ceased the 
Sixty-fourth Ohio reformed its broken ranks a few 
steps in rear of the breastwork and just east of the 
cotton-gin. I did not learn all the facts that night, 
but when they came out later, it transpired that every 
man in my company, save one, who had escaped the 
casualties of the battle, fell into line. A thousand- 



The Battle of Franklin 31 

dollar substitute had fled to the town where he hid in 
a cellar. He went to sleep there and awoke the next 
morning inside the rebel lines. He was sent south to 
a prison and when returning north after the close of 
the war lost his life in the explosion of the Steamer 
Sultana. 

I had lost my overcoat, but had never let go the 
grip on my sword. Some of my men had dropped 
their knapsacks or blanket rolls, but every one of 
them had his gun and cartridge box. They were all 
in high spirits over their own escape and over the 
part they had played in the final repulse of the rebels, 
and were talking and laughing over their various ad- 
ventures in the greatest good humor. The condition 
of my company was typical of the condition of all the 
other companies in the regiment as I saw, while pass- 
ing along the line inquiring into the fate of brother 
ofiicers and other friends. I also learned in a con- 
versation the next day with Major Coulter, who had 
been my old captain, and who was acting that night 
as assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, that every 
other regiment of the brigade had reformed in rear 
of the breastwork in the same way as the Sixty-fourth 
Ohio, and that the brigade as an organization, had 
marched from the vicinity of the cotton-gin when the 
order to retreat was executed that night. 

I never heard from any source any intimation con- 
trary to the truth as I have stated it until I read in 
1882, with the most indignant surprise, in Cox's book 
on this campaign, then recently published, his state- 
ment that the brigades of Lane and Conrad rallied at 
the river but were not again carried into action. 



32 John K. Shellenherger 

When Cox made that statement he was more con- 
cerned in patching up that fatal gap in the battle line 
of his own command without any outside assistance, 
than he was in ascertaining the truth, and he took 
that way to dispose of two entire brigades. In his 
first official report, for he made two reports, Cox 
went to the other extreme for he then stated that on 
the approach of the enemy the two brigades in front 
had retired in a leisurely manner inside his line. 
"Leisurely" is so good in that connection that it al- 
ways brings a smile whenever I recall the 'leisurely" 
manner in which Conrad's brigade made its wayback 
to Cox's line. Moreover in a letter to General Wag- 
ner, written two days after the battle, and inclosing a 
copy of a letter to General Thomas, urging the pro- 
motion of Colonel Opdycke, Cox took occasion to 
express the opinion he then held, based on his per- 
sonal observation, of the conduct of Wagner's entire 
division : 

I desire also to express my admiration of the gallantry of 
your whole command. Indeed an excess of bravery kept the 
two brigades a little too long in front, so that the troops at 
the main line could not get to firing upon the advancing en- 
emy till they were uncomfortably near. 

Soon after the regiment had reformed one of the 
drafted men of my company was brought in from the 
ditch outside mortally wounded. No doubt he had 
reached the ditch in too exhausted a condition to 
climb over the breastwork and had lain out among the 
rebels where he had been repeatedly hit by our own 
fire. The pain of his wounds had made him crazy, 
for he would not talk, but kept crawling about on all 



The Battle of Franklin 33 

fours moaning in agony. There were a few men 
missing from the company of whom their comrades 
could give no account. Moved by the fate of the 
drafted man, I crossed the breastwork to search out- 
side, if perchance I might find one or more of the 
missing ones lying there wounded and bring them 
aid. I went to a gun of the Sixth Ohio battery, 
posted a short distance east of the cotton-gin, to get 
over; and as I stepped up into the embrasure, the 
sight that met my eyes was most horrible even in the 
dim starlight. The mangled bodies of the dead reb- 
els were piled up as high as the mouth of the em- 
brasure, and the gunners said that repeatedly when 
the lanyard was pulled the embrasure was filled with 
men, crowding forward to get in, who were literally 
blown from the mouth of the cannon. Only one 
rebel got past the muzzle of that gun and one of the 
gunners snatched up a pick leaning against the breast- 
work and killed him with that. Captain Baldwin of 
this battery has stated that as he stood by one of his 
guns, watching the effect of its fire, he could hear the 
smashing of the bones when the missiles tore their 
way through the dense ranks of the approaching 
rebels. 

While I was cautiously making my way around 
one side of that heap of mangled humanity, a wound- 
ed man lying at the bottom, with head and shoulders 
protruding, begged me for the love of Christ to pull 
the dead bodies off him. The ditch was piled pro- 
miscuously with the dead and badly wounded and 
heads, arms, and legs were sticking out in almost 
every conceivable manner. The ground near the 



34 John K. Shellenberger 

ditch was so thickly covered with bodies that I had to 
pick my steps carefully to avoid treading on some of 
them. The air was filled with the moans of the 
wounded ; and the pleadings for water and for help of 
some of those who saw me were heartrending. While 
walking along towards the pike to get in the pathway 
in which my company had come back, I passed two 
rebel flags lying on the ground close together. It 
did not occur to me that I would be entitled to any 
credit for picking up the flags under such circum- 
stances, but I thought that if I did not find what I 
was looking for I would return that way and take the 
flags in with me. I had passed on a few steps when 
I heard a man behind me exclaim, "Look out, there!" 
Thinking he meant me, I turned hastily and saw him 
pitch the two flags over the breastwork. I presume 
that the men inside the work who got possession of 
the flags were afterwards sent to Washington with 
them and possibly may have received medals for 
their capture. I felt so uneasy while outside, lest the 
rebels should make some movement that would start 
our line to firing again that I kept close to the breast- 
work, and as it was soon manifest that the chance in 
the darkness of finding a friend, where the bodies 
were so many, was too remote to justify the risk I was 
taking, I returned within our line. 

From what I saw while outside I have always be- 
lieved that General Hood never stated his losses ful- 
ly. Those losses were in some respects without pre- 
cedent in either army on any other battle-field of the 
war. He had five generals killed, six wounded and 
one captured on our breastworks, and the slaughter 



The Battle of Franklin 35 

of field and company officers, as well as of the rank 
and file, was correspondingly frightful. It was offi- 
cially reported of Quarles's brigade that the ranking 
officer in the entire brigade at the close of the battle 
was a captain. Of the nine divisions of infantry com- 
posing Hood's army, seven divisions got up in time to 
take part in the assault and at least six of these seven 
divisions were as badly wrecked as was Pickett's di- 
vision in its famous charge at Gettysburg. 

Our loss was officially stated as two thousand, three 
hundred, twenty-six men and almost the whole of it 
was due to the presence of the two brigades in front 
of the main line. Casement's brigade, to the left of 
Reilly's, sustained a very determined assault which 
was repulsed with a loss of only three killed and six- 
teen wounded. But the action of Casement's men 
was not hampered by the presence of any of Wag- 
ner's men in their front and they could open fire as 
soon as the rebels came within range. If the brigades 
of Reilly and Strickland could have opened fire un- 
der the same conditions they would have done just as 
well as Casement's brigade. A critical investigation 
of our losses will conclusively demonstrate that at 
Franklin the violation of the military axiom never to 
post a small body of troops in a way to hamper the 
action of the main body was directly responsible for 
the unnecessary loss of more than two thousand of 
our soldiers. That was the frightful butchers' bill 
our army had to pay for a bit of incompetent general- 
ship. 

How was it possible for veteran generals of the 
Atlanta campaign to make such a gross blunder? 



36 John K. Shellenberger 

In his official report Cox states that at two o'clock 
the enemy came into full view and he reported that 
fact and the position of the two brigades in front of 
his breastworks to Schofield and received his orders 
with reference to holding the position; but he does 
not state what those orders were. Cox made that 
report and received those orders in a personal con- 
ference with Schofield when they must have fully 
discussed the situation, and Cox's peculiar statement 
in this connection seems to carry a covert threat, as if 
he had said to Schofield, ''If you attempt to hold me 
responsible for the blunder I will tell what those 
orders of yours were." 

In a written account furnished me by Captain 
Whitesides, Wagner's assistant adjutant-general, he 
states that about half past two o'clock Wagner or- 
dered him to see Colonel Lane and find out what was 
going on in his front. From his position on the pike 
at the gap in the breastworks Wagner could see for 
himself Stewart's corps forming in Conrad's front, 
as already described, but his view of Lane's front was 
obstructed by the large number of trees and by the in- 
equalities of the ground on the west side of the pike. 
Colonel Lane told Whitesides that Hood was form- 
ing his army in battle order and that without any 
doubt it was his intention to attack in force; that the 
position occupied by the two brigades was faulty, 
being without any support on either flank, and unless 
they were withdrawn they would be run over by the 
enemy or compelled to fall back to the breastworks 
under fire. On reporting Lane's statement to Wag- 
ner, Whitesides was directed to find General Stanley, 



The Battle of Franklin 37 

the corps commander, and tell him what Lane had 
said. He found Stanley with Schofield at the house 
of Doctor Clifife in the central part of the town, 
where they could see nothing of what was going on 
in front, and reported to them as stated above. He 
then returned to Wagner who, so far as he knew, re- 
ceived no further orders. 

The report of Cox and the statement of Whitesides 
indicate that both Cox and Wagner believed that 
Hood intended to attack but that neither of them 
would take the responsibility, with Schofield in easy 
communication, of withdrawing the two brigades 
without his sanction from the position to which they 
had been assigned by his order. They reported to 
him the situation and then waited, and waited in vain, 
for him to take action. 

In a personal interview Doctor Clifife told me that 
Schofield came to his house about nine o'clock for 
breakfast and afterwards kept his headquarters there 
until the battle began; that after breakfast he retired 
to a bedroom where he slept until noon or shortly 
after; that a short time before the battle began Cox 
was there in conference with Schofield and stafif of- 
ficers kept coming and going until the fighting be- 
gan; that Stanley was there with Schofield and they 
were waiting for their dinner; that they told him 
there would be no battle that day because Hood 
would not attack breastworks but that after dinner 
they would ride on to Nashville together and the 
army would follow after dark. 

Stanley and Clifife had been schoolboys together in 
Wayne County, Ohio, and as Clifife was a well known 



38 John K. Shellenherger 

Union man, it was supposed to be unsafe for him to 
remain in Franklin and he was invited to accompany 
Schofield and Stanley on their ride to Nashville. 
General Schofield has claimed that he scored a great 
success in his campaign against Hood and that this 
success was largely due to his intimate knowledge of 
Hood's character, gained while they were classmates 
at West Point, which enabled him to foresee what 
Hood would do and then make the proper disposi- 
tions to defeat him. At Franklin he relied so confi- 
dently on his ability to foretell what Hood's action 
would be that he not only wholly neglected to give 
any personal attention to the preparations for assault 
which Hood was making in plain sight of our front 
but he would not give any heed to the reports brought 
him by those who had seen these preparations. It 
was his belief, based on his intimate knowledge of 
Hood's character, that Hood was making an osten- 
tatious feint to mask his real intention of executing 
a flank movement, for in a telegram to General 
Thomas, dated at three o'clock, Schofield informed 
Thomas that Hood was in his front with about two 
corps and seemed prepared to cross the river above 
and below. 

He has tried to escape all personal responsibility 
for the blunder by the weak statement that he was 
across the river when the battle began. Even if that 
statement were true, and it is directly contradicted by 
the disinterested statement of Doctor Clifife as well as 
by an abundance of other reliable evidence, both 
direct and circumstantial, there is no possible escape 
for Schofield from the inexorable logic of the situa- 



The Battle of Franklin 39 

tion. For two hours Hood was engaged in prepara- 
tions for assault in plain sight of thousands of our 
soldiers. What was Schofield doing those two 
hours? If he saw anything of Hood's preparations 
he showed incompetence by his failure to promptly 
withdraw the two brigades from the blundering posi- 
tion to which he had assigned them. If he saw 
nothing of Hood's preparations, it was only because 
of a criminal neglect of his duty at a time when the 
perilous position of his army, with a greatly superior 
rebel army in its front and a river at its back, de- 
manded his utmost vigilance. 

It was said that General Stanley was sick but he 
spent the day with Schofield and he also, having had 
West Point experience of Hood's character, con- 
curred fully in Schofield's belief that Hood would 
not assault. So great was their delusion in this re- 
spect that it could not be shaken by the reports made 
by their subordinates, and nothing short of the loud 
roar of the opening battle was able to arouse them 
into giving any personal attention to the situation. 
Then at last, when it was too late to do anything to 
remedy a blunder which already had gone so far that 
it must go on to its full culmination, Schofield and 
Stanley left the house of Doctor Clifle. Stanley hur- 
ried to the front which he reached just as Opdycke's 
brigade was starting forward. Spurring his horse to 
the front of this brigade, he personally led it in its 
famous charge. A little later his horse was shot 
under him and he got a bullet through the back of his 
neck as he was rising to his feet. It was a flesh 
wound that bled freely, but Stanley declined to leave 



40 John K. Shellenberger 

the front until after the fighting was all over. He 
then went to the rear to have his wound dressed and 
after his departure Cox was the senior general on the 
battle-field. 

When Stanley started for the front Schofield started 
for the rear, and the most charitable construction that 
can be placed upon his action is that he interpreted 
the sound of the firing to mean that the expected 
flank movement had begun and that his duty called 
him across the river to provide against that flank 
movement. His disturbed mental condition at that 
time is disclosed by the fact that he abandoned in the 
room of Cliffe's house, where he had slept, his over- 
coat, gloves, and a package containing the official dis- 
patches he had received from General Thomas. 
These articles were not reclaimed until our army re- 
turned to Franklin after the victory at Nashville and 
in the meantime Mrs. Cliffe saved the coat from be- 
ing taken by some needy rebel by wearing it herself 
and she also safely kept the gloves and dispatches. 

After crossing the river Schofield rode to the fort 
that had been built the year before on the high bluff 
which formed the north bank. From this elevated 
position he had a good view of a large part of the 
battle-field and the heavy guns in the fort were en- 
gaged in firing on the nearest flank of the enemy; but 
he was not only well beyond the range of every rebel 
bullet that was fired, but he was also so far away by 
the road which a staff ofiicer must take to communi- 
cate with the firing line, that he was wholly out of 
touch with the troops that were fighting the battle. 
His presence in the fort had no more to do with the 



The Battle of Franklin 41 

repulse of Hood's assault than if he had been the 
man-in-the-moon looking down upon the battle-field. 
The only order that he sent from the fort was the 
order to retreat after the army had won a great vic- 
tory. When this order reached Cox he made a manly 
protest against it. He explained the wrecked condi- 
tion of the rebel army to the stafif officer, who brought 
the order, and giving his opinion that retreat was 
wholly unnecessary, he urged the officer to return to 
Schofield and persuade him to countermand the or- 
der. He also sent his brother, Captain Cox, of his 
own stafif, to remonstrate with Schofield, and to say 
that General Cox would be responsible with his head 
for holding the position. When Captain Cox reached 
the fort he found that Schofield already had started 
for Nashville. The Captain hurried in pursuit and, 
overtaking Schofield on the pike and delivering his 
message, was told that the order to retreat would not 
be recalled and must be executed. In Wagner's 
division we had been marching, or fortifying, or 
fighting for more than forty hours continuously, and 
believed that we had reached the limit of human en- 
durance, but we still had to plod the eighteen weary 
miles to Nashville before getting any rest. 

In January, 1865, Schofield, with the corps that he 
was then commanding, was transferred from Ten- 
nessee to North Carolina. When he passed through 
Washington en route he had the opportunity of giv- 
ing to President Lincoln a personal account of his 
campaign in Tennessee. The president must have 
known in a general way, that at Franklin the rebel 
army had made a very desperate assault which had 



42 John K. Shellenberger 

been most disastrously repulsed, but he certainly was 
ignorant of the details of the battle, and in the ab- 
sence of any information to the contrary, his natural 
inference would be that Schofield, as our command- 
ing general, was entitled to great credit for that re- 
pulse. At that time the truth concerning Schofield's 
connection with the battle was known to a few men 
only and those who would have exposed his preten- 
sions, if they had had any knowledge of what he was 
claiming, were all far away in Tennessee. The claim 
for distinguished services which Schofield succeeded 
in impressing upon "Honest Old Abe" may be fairly 
inferred from the very extraordinary promotion 
given him over the heads of many able and deserving 
officers -namely, from captain to brigadier-general 
in the regular army, to date November 30, 1864, with 
a brevet as major-general "for gallant and meritorious 
services in the battle of Franklin, Tennessee." 



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